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Respondent Erred As a Matter of Law In Finding That 
Petitioner's Home Was Not An Exempt Asset Under the 
Medicaid Statute 
Respondent contends that petitioner has attempted to sell 
the six and one-half acres across the road, and so It is an 
available asset. That argument is not dispositive. 
Petitioner's intentions do not govern in determining whether 
there are in fact two separate lots. Admittedly, once the 
property is sold it would be considered legally divided. 
However, until such a legal interest haa been created in another 
party, the property remains a single, undivided entity. 
Respondent also contends that petitioner's evidence which 
shows that the lot is not subdivided, the city plat introduced 
at the hearing, is not dispositive. (R. 46). Nevertheless, 
respondent admits that the road is not entered on the plat and 
that a recent tax notice contains no reference to an easement or 
right-of-way over the lot. (Respondent's Brief p. 9). 
Respondent suggests, however, that these facts do not refute 
that the six and one-half acres have been valued at $15,000.00, 
and are thus an available asset for eligibility determination. 
This argument misses the point. 
1 
First, despite respondent's contention, the record does not 
show that the property is worth $15,000,00. All the record 
indicates is that this was the amount that was asked by 
petitioner Tibbetts. (R. 37). The property does not 
necessarily have that much value, however, as it has never been 
formally appraised. Moreover, the fact that the property has 
not sold at this price would suggest that it is not worth 
$15,000.00. 
Second, and more important, whether the six and one-half 
acres are worth $15,000.00 or not, the city plat evidence shows 
that the property—all 8.14 acres—is a single lot. Despite the 
monetary value of some of petitioner's acres, the crucial 
question is whether those acres constitute a single whole. No 
legal Interest has been created which subdivides petitioner's 
interest in the entire lot. (R. 70). Thus, petitioner owns all 
of the land over which the path crosses and his evidence of 
ownership outweighs any supposed division created by the 
caseworker. 
The introduction of the plat also shows that petitioner's 
8.14 acre lot does not exceed the average size lot for the 
community of Genola, Utah. (R. 46). A visual comparison of 
petitioner's lot with those of others in the plat shows that it 
is smaller than the majority of the properties contained therein. 
2 
Respondent is correct in concluding that petitioner's 
argument presupposes the path does not divide the property. 
(Respondent's brief p. 10). This is because of the strength of 
petitioner's evidence. It Is equally true that respondent's 
argument presupposes that the road does divide the property into 
separate parcels. However, in light of the evidence on record, 
and the absence of contrary evidence, the city plat shows that 
the property in controversy is legally one lot. Thus, because 
the six and one-half acres are part of the lot upon which 
petitioner's home resides, under APA Volume III 411.1, 
petitioner's home and lot, all eight acres, should be exempt 
from the Medicaid eligiblity determination. Clearly, the record 
contains ample evidence showing that th$ caseworker failed to 
reasonably interpret the regulations and thus respondent 
Dandoy's decision was erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner has established that he was eligible for 
Medicaid during December, 1985, because the home he was living 
in was exempt. The lot on which the home was situated was also 
exempt, since it did not exceed an average size lot for the 
community where he lived. Respondent hfts failed to establish 
that petitioner owned a separate parcel of land. Therefore, 
respondent's disqualification of petitioner was an unreasonable 
3 
application of the federal statute and regulations. Petitioner 
requests that the Court reverse the decision of the district 
court and enter its order requiring respondent to award him 
medicaid benefits for the months of December, 1985. 
DATED this J3 day of QjJ^&SJJlA , 1988. 
CEELLA LAWRENCE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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